TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................1

II. METHODOLOGY .........................................................................................................................1

III. NUMBER AND TIMING OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS ....................................................3

IV. CATEGORIES OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS ..................................6
A. Statements that Iraq Posed an Urgent Threat..................................................6
B. Statements about Iraq’s Nuclear Capabilities .................................................7
1. Claims about the Status of Iraq’s Nuclear Program .........................................8
2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes .................................................................10
3. Claims about Uranium from Africa .................................................................13
C. Statements about Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs ............15
1. Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons .............................................15
2. Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles .........................................................18
3. Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories ..................................................20
D. Statements about Iraq’s Support of al Qaeda..................................................21
V. MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS.................25
A. President Bush................................................................................................25
B. Vice President Cheney....................................................................................26
C. Secretary Rumsfeld.........................................................................................27
D. Secretary Powell ............................................................................................28
E. National Security Advisor Rice ........................................................................29
VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................30
 

IRAQ ON THE RECORD:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 19, 2003, U.S. forces began military operations in Iraq. Addressing the
nation about the purpose of the war on the day the bombing began, President
Bush stated: “The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not
live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of
mass murder.”

One year later, many doubts have been raised regarding the Administration’s
assertions about the threat posed by Iraq. Prior to the war in Iraq, the President
and his advisors repeatedly claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction that jeopardized the security of the United States. The failure to
discover these weapons after the war has led to questions about whether the
President and his advisors were candid in describing Iraq’s threat.

This report, which was prepared at the request of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, is a
comprehensive examination of the statements made by the five Administration
officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public
opinion on Iraq: President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney,
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. It finds that the five officials made
misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125 public appearances.
The report and an accompanying database identify 237 specific misleading
statements by the five officials.

Methodology

The Special Investigations Division compiled a database of statements about Iraq
made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary
Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice. All of the statements in the database
were drawn from speeches, press conferences and briefings, interviews, written
statements, and testimony by the five officials.

This Iraq on the Record database contains statements made by the five officials
that were misleading at the time they were made. The database does not include
statements that appear in hindsight to be erroneous but were accurate reflections
of the views of intelligence officials at the time they were made. The entire
database is accessible to members of Congress and the public at
www.reform.house.gov/min.

This report is a summary of the Iraq on the Record database. Because the
officials’ statements have been compiled into a searchable database, the report can
make new observations about the topics that were the subject of misleading
claims, the timing of these claims, and the officials who were responsible. To
ensure objectivity, the report was peer reviewed for fairness and accuracy by two
leading experts: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-
Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and
Greg Thielmann, former acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation,
and Military Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and
Research.

Findings

Number of Misleading Statements.  The Iraq on the Record database contains
237 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq that were made by
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,
and National Security Advisor Rice. These statements were made in 125 separate
appearances, consisting of 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53
interviews, 4 written statements, and 2 congressional testimonies. Most of the
statements in the database were misleading because they expressed certainty
where none existed or failed to acknowledge the doubts of intelligence officials.
Ten of the statements were simply false.

Timing of the Statements.  The statements began at least a year before the
commencement of hostilities in Iraq, when Vice President Cheney stated on
March 17, 2002: “We know they have biological and chemical weapons.” The
Administration’s misleading statements continued through January 22, 2004,
when Vice President Cheney insisted: “there’s overwhelming evidence that there
was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government.” Most of the
misleading statements about Iraq — 161 statements — were made prior to the
start of the war. But 76 misleading statements were made by the five
Administration officials after the start of the war to justify the decision to go to
war.

The 30-day period with the greatest number of misleading statements was the
period before the congressional vote on the Iraq war resolution. Congress voted
on the measure on October 10 and October 11, 2002. From September 8 through
October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public
appearances. A large number of misleading statements were also made during the
two months before the war began. Between January 19 and March 19, 2003, the
five officials made 48 misleading statements in 26 public appearances.
Topics of the Statements. The 237 misleading statements can be divided into
four categories. The five officials made 11 statements that claimed that Iraq
posed an urgent threat; 81 statements that exaggerated Iraq’s nuclear activities; 84
statements that overstated Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities;
and 61 statements that misrepresented Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda.

Statements by President Bush.  Between September 12, 2002, and July 17,
2003, President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the threat posed by
Iraq in 27 separate public appearances. On October 7, 2002, three days before the
congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution, President Bush gave a speech in
Cincinnati, Ohio, with 11 misleading statements, the most by any of the five
officials in a single appearance.

Some of the misleading statements by President Bush include his statement in the
January 28, 2003, State of the Union address that “the British government has
learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa”; his statement on October 2, 2002, that “the Iraqi regime is a threat
of unique urgency”; and his statement on May 1, 2003, that “the liberation of Iraq
. . . removed an ally of al Qaeda.”

Statements by Vice President Cheney.  Between March 17, 2002, and January
22, 2004, Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about the threat
posed by Iraq in 25 separate public appearances.

Some of the misleading statements by Vice President Cheney include his
statement on September 8, 2002, that “we do know, with absolute certainty, that
he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs . . . to build
a nuclear weapon”; his statement on March 16, 2003, that “we believe he has, in
fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons”; and his statement on October 10, 2003, that
Saddam Hussein “had an established relationship with al Qaeda.”

Statements by Secretary Rumsfeld.  Between May 22, 2002, and November 2,
2003, Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the threat posed
by Iraq in 23 separate public appearances.

Some of the misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld include his statement
on November 14, 2002, that within “a week, or a month” Saddam Hussein could
give his weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda, which could use them to attack
the United States and kill “30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings”; his statement
on January 29, 2003, that Saddam Hussein’s regime “recently was discovered
seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa”; and his statement on July
13, 2003, that there “was never any debate” about whether Iraq had a nuclear
program.

Statements by Secretary Powell.  Between April 3, 2002, and October 3, 2003,
Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in
34 separate public appearances.

Secretary Powell sometimes used caveats and qualifying language in his public
statements. His statements that contained such cautions or limitations were not
included in the database. Nonetheless, many of Secretary Powell’s statements did
not include these qualifiers and were misleading in their expression of certainty,
such as his statement on May 22, 2003, that “there is no doubt in our minds now
that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make
biological weapons.”

Statements by National Security Advisor Rice.  Between September 8, 2002,
and September 28, 2003, National Security Advisor Rice made 29 misleading
statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 16 separate public appearances.
Although Ms. Rice had the fewest public appearances and the fewest misleading
statements, she had the highest number of statements — 8 — that were false.
These false statements included several categorical assertions that that no one in
the White House knew of the intelligence community’s doubts about the
President’s assertion that Iraq sought to import uranium from Africa.

I. INTRODUCTION

The President and his senior advisors have a special obligation to describe
accurately the national security threats facing the nation. This special obligation
derives in part from the nature of the subject. There is no decision that is more
grave than sending our armed forces to battle. The special obligation also derives
in part from the unique access that the President and his advisors have to
classified information. On matters of national security, only the President and his
advisors have full access to the relevant classified information. Members of
Congress and the public see only a partial picture based on the information the
President and his advisors decide to release.

Recently, serious questions have been raised regarding whether President Bush
and his Administration met this special obligation. Numerous news reports and
columns have questioned the accuracy of specific statements by President Bush
and other Administration officials. The White House maintains that any
misstatements were “only a small part of an ‘overwhelming’ case that Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States.”1 Other observers,
though, have detected a pattern of consistent misrepresentation.

The one-year anniversary of the beginning of military operations in Iraq marks an
occasion for comprehensively assessing whether the President and his senior
advisors met their obligation to accurately present intelligence to the American
public. For this reason, Rep. Waxman asked the Special Investigations Division
to assemble in a single database any misleading statements made by President
Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other senior Administration officials about the
threat posed by Iraq. This report summarizes key findings from this Iraq on the
Record database. The database itself is available to members of Congress and the
public at www.reform.house.gov/min.

II. METHODOLOGY
The Iraq on the Record database contains statements from the five Administration
officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public
opinion on the Iraq war: President George Bush; Vice President Richard Cheney;
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Secretary of State Colin Powell; and
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

The statements in the database are drawn from 125 public statements or
appearances in which the five officials discussed the threat posed by Iraq. The
sources of the statements are 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53
interviews, 4 written statements and articles, and 2 appearances before
congressional committees. Quotes from the officials in newspaper articles or
other similar secondary sources were not included in the database because of the
difficulty of discerning the context of such quotes and ensuring their accuracy.
Statements made by the officials before March 2002, one year before the
commencement of hostilities in Iraq, were also not included.
The database contains statements that were misleading based on what was known
to the Administration at the time the statements were made. In compiling the
database, the Special Investigations Division did not assess whether
“subjectively” the officials believed a specific statement to be misleading.
Instead, the investigators used an “objective” standard. For purposes of the
database, a statement is considered “misleading” if it conflicted with what
intelligence officials knew at the time or involved the selective use of intelligence
or the failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats.

The database does not include statements that appear mistaken only in hindsight.
If a statement was an accurate reflection of U.S. intelligence at the time it was
made, the statement is excluded from the database even if it now appears
erroneous.

To determine whether a statement was misleading, the Special Investigations
Division examined the statement in light of intelligence known to the
Administration at the time of the statement. The primary sources for determining
the intelligence available to the Administration were (1) the portions of the
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that have been released to the public,
(2) the February 5, 2004, statement by Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet entitled Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (3) the recent report of the
nonpartisan Carnegie Endowment for International Peace entitled WMD in Iraq:
Evidence and Implications, and (4) news and other reports quoting U.S. officials
regarding the intelligence available to the Administration on Iraq.

In general, hypothetical and implied statements about threats posed by Iraq were
not included in the database of misleading statements. A few such statements
were included, however, where they implied a threat in evocative and frightening
language. These statements were misleading because the effect was to instill in
the public the perception that the threat actually existed.

To be conservative, the Special Investigations Division excluded hundreds of
statements by the five officials that many observers would consider misleading.
For example, the five officials made numerous claims that Iraq “had” stockpiles
of chemical weapons. Many of these statements were misleading in that they
implied that Iraq possessed these stockpiles currently and did not acknowledge
the doubts of intelligence experts. Nevertheless, these statements were not
included in the database when they were expressed in the past tense because Iraq
did possess chemical weapons at least as late as the early 1990s and used them
during the 1980s.

Investigators also excluded scores of statements of certainty that Iraq possessed
“weapons of mass destruction” prior to the war. To many observers, these
statements would be misleading because they implied that Iraq possessed nuclear
weapons without acknowledging the divisions among intelligence officials about
whether this was the case. The Special Investigations Division excluded these
general “weapons of mass destruction” assertions, however, because of the
ambiguity inherent in the phrase.

The Special Investigations Division asked two leading independent experts to
peer review this report for fairness and accuracy. These two independent experts
are: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation
Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Greg Thielmann,
former acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military
Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These
experts judged that this report is a fair and accurate depiction of the
Administration’s statements.

III. NUMBER AND TIMING OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,
and National Security Advisor Rice repeatedly made misleading statements about
the threat posed by Iraq. They made these statements in 125 separate public
appearances. The total number of misleading statements made by the five
officials is 237.

The 237 misleading statements were made in a variety of forums. On 53
occasions, the five officials gave interviews in which they made claims that were
misleading. They also made misleading statements in 40 speeches, 26 press
conferences and briefings, 4 written statements and articles, and 2 appearances
before Congress.

The misleading statements began at least one year before the start of the war in
Iraq, when Vice President Cheney stated on March 17, 2002:
The President’s made it clear that we are concerned about nations such as
Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction. We know the Iraqis have
been engaged in such efforts over the years. We know they have
2 United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, Unresolved Disarmament
Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes, UNMOVIC Working Document (Mar. 6, 2003).
biological and chemical weapons And we also have reason to believe
they’re pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

These misleading statements have continued through at least January 2004. On
January 22, 2004, Vice President Cheney said in a National Public Radio
interview, “I think there’s overwhelming evidence that there was a connection
between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government I’m very confident that there
was an established relationship there.”4 He also said in the same interview, “we
know . . . that prior to our going in that he had spent time and effort acquiring
mobile biological weapons labs, and we’re quite confident he did, in fact, have
such a program. We’ve found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we
believe were, in fact, part of that program.” As described below, both of these
assertions were misleading in that they failed to disclose the serious doubts held
by intelligence officials.

The majority of the misleading statements — 161 — were made in the buildup to
the war in Iraq. The volume of misleading statements by the five officials peaked
before key decision points in the buildup to the war. Congress began debate on
the Iraq war resolution in early October 2002 and voted on the measure on
October 10 and October 11, 2002. During the 30 days between September 8 and
October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public
appearances. This was the highest number of misleading statements for any 30-day
period.

There were also a large number of misleading statements in the two months
before hostilities began on March 19, 2003, when the five officials made 48
misleading statements in 26 public appearances.

Most of the misleading statements in the Iraq on the Record database involve the
selective use of intelligence or the failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats.
For example, statements of certainty that Iraq was close to possessing nuclear
weapons were misleading because they ignored significant doubts and
disagreement in the U.S. intelligence community regarding whether Iraq was
actively pursuing a nuclear program.

In 10 instances, however, the statements included in the database were false
statements that directly contradicted facts known at the time by the
Administration. For example, on July 11, 2003, Ms. Rice stated with respect to
the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa: “Now, if there were doubts
about the underlying intelligence . . . those doubts were not communicated to the
President, to the Vice President, or to me.”5 This statement is false because, as
Ms. Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley subsequently acknowledged, the CIA sent Ms.
Rice and Mr. Hadley memos in October 2002 warning against the use of this
claim.

IV. CATEGORIES OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS
The misleading statements by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary
Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice fall into four
general categories: (1) statements suggesting that Iraq posed an urgent threat, (2)
statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities, (3) statements regarding Iraq’s
biological and chemical weapons capabilities, and (4) statements regarding Iraq’s
support of al Qaeda.
 

A. Statements that Iraq Posed an Urgent Threat
On February 5, 2004, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet categorically
stated that the U.S. intelligence community “never said there was an ‘imminent’
threat.” Yet this was not the impression conveyed by President Bush, Vice
President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security
Advisor Rice in their public statements on Iraq. In 10 different appearances, these
five officials made 11 statements claiming that Iraq posed an urgent threat.
For example:

• President Bush stated on October 2, 2002: “the Iraqi regime is a threat of
unique urgency [I]t has developed weapons of mass death.”

• President Bush stated on November 20, 2002: “Today the world is . . .
uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq.”

• Vice President Cheney stated on August 26, 2002: “Simply stated, there is
no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.
There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against
our allies, and against us.”

In one instance, Secretary Rumsfeld said that Iraq could give weapons of mass
destruction to al Qaeda in “a week, or a month,” resulting in the deaths of up to
100,000 people. On November 14, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld stated:
Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a month,
and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass destruction and
transfer them, either use them himself, or transfer them to the Al-Qaeda,
and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the United
States, or an attack on U.S. forces overseas, with a weapon of mass
destruction you’re not talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being
killed, but 30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings.”

B. Statements about Iraq’s Nuclear Capabilities
In their potential for destruction and their ability to evoke horror, nuclear weapons
are in a class by themselves. As Dr. David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq
Survey Group, testified on January 28, 2004: “all of us have and would continue
to put the nuclear weapons in a different category. It’s a single weapon that can
do tremendous damage, as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same
order of damage I think we should politically treat nuclear as a difference.”

For precisely this reason, the Administration’s statements about Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities had a large impact on congressional and public perceptions about the
threat posed by Iraq. Many members of Congress were more influenced by the
Administration’s nuclear assertions than by any other piece of evidence. Rep.
Waxman, for example, wrote to President Bush in June 2003 that in voting for the
Iraq war resolution: “Like other members, I was particularly influenced by your
views about Iraq’s nuclear intentions. Although chemical and biological weapons
can inflict casualties, no threat is greater than the threat of nuclear weapons.”
Numerous members of Congress stressed Iraq’s nuclear threat in their floor
statements explaining their support of the resolution.

Despite the significance of the nuclear issue, President Bush, Vice President
Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor
Rice repeatedly misrepresented the nuclear threat posed by Iraq. The five
officials made 49 separate public appearances in which they made misleading
statements about Iraq’s nuclear threat. In these appearances, they made a total of
81 misleading statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities.

These misleading statements generally fall into one of three categories: (1)
misleading statements about the status of Iraq’s nuclear program, (2) misleading
statements about the purpose of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq, and (3)
misleading statements about Iraq’s attempts to obtain uranium from Africa.

1. Claims about the Status of Iraq’s Nuclear Program
Prior to the war, there were significant divisions within the intelligence
community about whether Iraq had resumed efforts to make nuclear weapons. In
his speech on February 5, 2004, Mr. Tenet explained that there was not unanimity
on whether Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and that these differences
were described in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): “let me be clear,
where there were differences, the Estimate laid out the disputes clearly.” In
particular, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
concluded in the NIE that “[t]he activities we have detected do not, however, add
up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider
to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.”
INR added: “Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent
effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate
that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors.”  The INR
position was similar to the conclusions of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which concluded that there was “no indication of resumed
nuclear activities . . . nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities.”

These doubts and qualifications, however, were not communicated to the public.
Instead, the five Administration officials repeatedly made unequivocal comments
about Iraq’s nuclear program. For example, President Bush said in October 2002
that “[t]he regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons and is
seeking the materials required to do so.”18 Several days later, President Bush
asserted that Saddam Hussein “is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear
weapon.”

Vice President Cheney made perhaps the single most egregious statement about
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, claiming: “we know he has been absolutely devoted to
trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted
nuclear weapons.”20 He made this statement just three days before the war. He
did not admit until September 14, 2003, that his statement was wrong and that he
“did misspeak.”

President Bush and others portrayed the threat of Saddam Hussein waging nuclear
war against the United States or its allies as one of the most urgent reasons for
preemptively attacking Iraq. Administration officials used evocative language
and images. On the eve of congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, for
example, President Bush stated: “Knowing these realities, America must not
ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot
wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a
mushroom cloud.”

Following the commencement of military operations in Iraq, Administration
officials continued to make misleading statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear
program. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld denied on July 13, 2003, that there
was “any debate” about Iraq’s nuclear capabilities within the Administration,
stating: “We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate.”

Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has been unable to find evidence of
the nuclear program described by the five officials. On October 2, 2003, David
Kay reported that “we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook
significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile
material.” In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay reported that “[i]t was
not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program.” He added, “As best as has
been determined . . . in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear establishment had
deteriorated to such point that it was totally useless.” His conclusion was that
there was “no doubt at all” that Iraq had less of an ability to produce fissile
material in 2001 than in 1991. According to Dr. Kay, the nuclear program had
been “seriously degraded” and the “activities of the inspectors in the early ‘90s
did a tremendous amount.”

2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes
In 2001 and 2002, shipments of aluminum tubes to Iraq were intercepted. This
discovery led to an active debate within intelligence agencies about the intended
use of the tubes.

Numerous experts believed the tubes were for conventional rockets rather than a
nuclear development program. In his February 5, 2004, speech, Mr. Tenet
explained that disagreement over the purpose of the aluminum tubes was “a
debate laid out extensively in the estimate and one that experts still argue over.”
The agency with the most technical expertise in this area, the Department of
Energy, believed that the tubes likely were not part of a nuclear enrichment
program, stating in the NIE that “the tubes probably are not part of the
program.”  The International Atomic Energy Agency agreed, concluding:
“There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use
in centrifuge enrichment.”

In addition to dissent from the Energy Department and international inspectors,
the State Department also expressed formal reservations, stating in the NIE that
“INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge
rotors.”  Instead, the State Department accepted the “judgment of technical
experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the
tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges.” The State
Department explained its position in detail:

The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by
the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the
procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE
assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for
use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.

According to the NIE, “INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are
intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets.”

These doubts about the use of the aluminum tubes were not conveyed by
Administration officials, however. Instead, the aluminum tubes became one of
the two principal pieces of information cited by the Administration to support the
claim that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. President Bush,
Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice
made 10 misleading statements in 9 public appearances about the significance of
the aluminum tubes.

For example, Ms. Rice stated on September 8, 2002: “We do know that there
have been shipments going into . . . Iraq . . . of aluminum tubes that . . . are only
really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.” Similarly,
Vice President Cheney said on September 8, 2002: “[Saddam Hussein] now is
trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs
to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs . . . [s]pecifically aluminum
tubes.” These statements were misleading because they did not present the
possibility that the tubes were suitable or intended for another purpose, or
acknowledge that key U.S. experts doubted that the tubes were intended to make
nuclear bombs.

In one instance, Secretary Powell did acknowledge that some experts disputed
that the aluminum tubes were intended for nuclear uses. In his February 5, 2003,
address before the United Nations, Secretary Powell stated, “By now, just about
everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of
opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most US experts
think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.”

Even in that statement, however, Secretary Powell did not make clear that experts
from the Department of Energy and the State Department’s own intelligence
division played a significant role in the analysis of this issue and in formal and
deliberate dissents had disputed the view that the tubes would likely be used to
enrich uranium.

On another occasion, Secretary Powell cited the tubes as evidence of pursuit of
nuclear weapons, without noting that the intended use of the tubes was under
dispute, asserting: “We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength
aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear
weapons program.”

By January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency had reached the
tentative conclusion that the aluminum tubes “would be consistent with the
purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for
manufacturing centrifuges.”

Group did not find evidence indicating that the tubes were intended for nuclear
use. In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay announced: “It is my judgment,
based on the evidence that was collected . . . that it’s more probable that those
tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program, rather than in a
centrifuge program.”

3. Claims about Uranium from Africa
Another significant component of the Administration’s nuclear claims was the
assertion that Iraq had sought to import uranium from Africa. As one of few new
pieces of intelligence, this claim was repeated multiple times by Administration
officials as proof that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In
total, the five Administration officials made misleading assertions about Iraq’s
attempts to obtain uranium from Africa in 7 statements in 6 public appearances.
In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President Bush stated:
“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa Saddam Hussein has not
credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.”

Other officials echoed this statement. In a January 23, 2003, New York Times oped
piece, Ms. Rice argued that Iraq had lied in its December 2002 declaration,
noting: “the declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get
uranium from abroad.”44 In his opening remarks in his televised press conference
on January 29, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “[Saddam Hussein’s] regime . . .
recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

These claims that Iraq was seeking to import uranium were misleading. The
documentary evidence behind the assertions was declared to be “not authentic” by
the International Atomic Energy Agency.46 An envoy, former Ambassador
Joseph Wilson, was sent by the CIA to investigate the alleged purchase.47
Ambassador Wilson concluded that it was “highly doubtful that any such
transaction had ever taken place,” and on his return, he provided detailed briefings
to the CIA and to the State Department African Affairs Bureau.48
When evidence emerged that the importation claim was false, Ms. Rice claimed
that the White House had no knowledge of these doubts. She asserted
unequivocally that no senior White House officials were informed about questions
about the uranium claim prior to its use in the State of the Union address. She
stated that “[t]he intelligence community did not know at that time, or at levels
that got to us . . . that there was serious questions about this report.” As she put
it on another occasion:

[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in
or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the Director of
Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.

Ms. Rice’s claims were simply false. The CIA sent two memos to the National
Security Council — one of which was addressed to Ms. Rice personally —
warning against including the claim in a speech by the President. Director of
Central Intelligence George Tenet also “argued personally” to Ms. Rice’s deputy
national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, “that the allegation should not be used”
by the President. Further, in the October 2002 NIE provided to top White
House officials, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research had
stated that claims that Iraq sought to acquire uranium in Africa were “highly
dubious.”

Ultimately, the White House was forced to admit its error. On July 9, 2003,
White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer said that the statement about importing
uranium from Africa “should not have risen to the level of a presidential
speech.” The White House minimized the significance of the Administration’s
use of the Niger claim, arguing that it was “only a small part of an
‘overwhelming’ case that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the
United States.”

C. Statements about Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,
and National Security Advisor Rice made misleading statements regarding Iraq’s
chemical and biological weapons programs in 61 public appearances. In these
appearances, the five officials made 84 different misleading statements. These
statements addressed three general topics: (1) Iraq’s chemical and biological
weapons, (2) Iraq’s efforts to build unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (3)
Iraq’s mobile biological laboratories.

1. Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons
Prior to the war, there were questions within the intelligence community about
whether Iraq in fact possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.
Because Iraq previously had such stockpiles, had used them in the past, and had
not adequately demonstrated that all previously produced stockpiles had been
destroyed, the intelligence community made an assessment in the October NIE
that it was likely that Iraq continued to possess them. Because intelligence
agencies had no direct evidence of such stockpiles, however, the conclusions in
the October NIE were cast in the context of an intelligence “estimate.” The NIE
began its sections on chemical and biological weapons with the phrases “we
assess” and “we judge.” The NIE concluded that Iraq “probably” had stockpiled
chemicals and “probably” had genetically engineered biological agents. The NIE
also included major qualifiers, such as: “We lack specific information on many
key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs.”

Other intelligence assessments specifically cited the uncertainty surrounding
Iraq’s possession of such stockpiles. In September 2002, the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) issued a report that concluded: “There is no reliable information
on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has
— or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.”  The
report also observed that “[a] substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical warfare
agents, precursors, munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between
1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United
Nations Special Commission) actions.”58 While the report assessed that Iraq
“probably” retained some “CW agents,” it warned that “we lack any direct
information.”

Despite these uncertainties among the intelligence officials, the five
Administration officials made 45 misleading statements in 35 appearances about
Iraq’s possession of chemical or biological weapons. Often these statements were
misleading because they projected certainty about their claims. Secretary Powell,
for example, claimed, “there is no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical
weapons stocks.” Secretary Rumsfeld stated: “He has at this moment
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.” Vice President Cheney
asserted: “We know they have biological and chemical weapons.”62 And
President Bush said bluntly, “he’s got them.”

Administration officials sometimes claimed to have specific details about
stockpile locations and movements. In his speech to the United Nations, for
example, Secretary Powell showed photographs of supposed Iraqi chemical
stockpiles, stating: “How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a
closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the
four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that
the bunkers are storing chemical munitions.”
Secretary Rumsfeld was even more specific, claiming that the Iraqis were
“moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours and placing
them in residential neighborhoods.” He also made this statement: “We know
where they are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west,
south, and north somewhat.”

The five officials also drew selectively from individual intelligence sources. In
1995, Hussein Kamel, the Iraqi official who had been in charge of Iraq’s weapons
of mass destruction programs, defected and described how Iraq had violated U.N.
resolutions in the early 1990s. Administration officials cited these claims
repeatedly. For example, President Bush said:

In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s
military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to
admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other
deadly biological agents This is a massive stockpile of biological
weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing
millions.

President Bush failed to disclose, however, that this same defector reported to
U.N. inspectors that Iraq had destroyed all of its chemical and biological weapons
stocks.

Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has reported that it is unlikely that
chemical or biological stockpiles existed prior to the war. As Dr. Kay concluded:
“I’m personally convinced that there were not large stockpiles of newly produced
weapons of mass destruction. We don’t find the people, the documents or the
physical plants that you would expect to find if the production was going on.”
Dr. Kay reported in October 2003 that “Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop,
produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed —
during Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN
inspections.”

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet echoed these findings: “It also
appears that Iraq had the infrastructure and talent to resume production — but we
have yet to find that it actually did so, nor have we found weapons.” His bottom
line was that “we do not know if production took place — and just as clearly —
we have not yet found biological weapons.”

2. Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Prior to the war, Administration officials raised the specter of Iraq using
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to distribute chemical or biological weapons
directly over the United States. Although there was agreement within the
intelligence community that Iraq had a UAV program, there was a sharp split over
whether these UAVs were designed to deliver chemical or biological weapons.
The October NIE concluded that the UAV program was “probably” intended to
deliver biological weapons. However, the government entity most knowledgeable
about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and
Space Intelligence Center, disagreed with this conclusion.74 According to the
NIE, the U.S. Air Force “does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily
intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents.”
Instead, the Air Force experts asserted that “[t]he small size of Iraq’s new UAV
strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance.”

The five Administration officials did not acknowledge these doubts in their public
statements, however. Instead, they made misleading assertions regarding the
purpose of the UAVs in 5 statements in 5 public appearances.
For example, on October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and October 11,
2002, congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution, President Bush claimed that
“Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be
used to disperse chemical or biological weapons.” He did not disclose that
experts at the Air Force found such a use improbable. Instead, he highlighted the
fear of Iraq’s UAVs being used “for missions targeting the United States.”76 Such
statements had an impact on members of Congress. For example, Senator Bill
Nelson voted for the Iraq war resolution “precisely because of the
administration’s UAV evidence.” He explained:

I was told not only that [Hussein had weapons of mass destruction] and
that he had the means to deliver them through unmanned aerial vehicles,
but that he had the capability of transporting those UAVs outside of Iraq
and threatening the homeland here in America, specifically by putting
them on ships off the eastern seaboard I thought there was an
imminent threat.

In his address to the United Nations, Secretary Powell asserted: “UAVs are well
suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence
that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that
could be adapted for UAVs.”79 In making his presentation to the U.N., Secretary
Powell showed a photo of an “illustrative” UAV, which he suggested was wellsuited
for spraying chemical or biological weapons over the United States. This
presentation affected members of Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that
of the various pieces of evidence presented by Secretary Powell, “the most
compelling to me was the unmanned aerial vehicle and the development of that
with spray tanks. And he kind of laid down the fact that this could be in our
country and there was a possibility that this might be used against the United
States.”

President Bush later highlighted Secretary Powell’s presentation, claiming: “All
the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank
modified to spray biological agents over wide areas A UAV launched from a
vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland.”

The Iraq Survey Group found little to substantiate these claims. According to Dr.
Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, Iraq’s UAV program “was not a strong point”
because it was only “theoretically possible” to have “snuck one of those on a ship
off the East Coast of the United States that might have been able to deliver a small
amount someplace.” He found only that “at least one of those families of UAVs”
was a “descendent” of another model that once had a “spray tank on it.” In his
assessment, there was no “existing deployment capability at that point for any sort
of systematic military attack.”

3. Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories
In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile trailers in Iraq.
Although intelligence experts disputed the purpose of the trailers, Administration
officials repeatedly asserted that they were mobile biological weapons
laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary
Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice made 34
misleading statements about the trailers in 27 separate public appearances.
Shortly after the trailers were found, the CIA and DIA issued an unclassified
white paper evaluating the trailers.

The white paper was released without coordination with other members of the intelligence
community, however. It was disclosed later that engineers from DIA who examined the trailers
concluded that they were most likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons.
A former senior intelligence official reported that “only one of 15 intelligence
analysts assembled from three agencies to discuss the issue in June endorsed the
white paper conclusion.”

Despite these doubts within the intelligence community, the five officials
repeatedly misled Congress and the public about the trailers by asserting without
qualification that they were proof of Iraq’s biological weapons program.
President Bush made perhaps the most prominent misleading statement on this
matter when he proclaimed:

We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological
laboratories. You remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the
world, and he said, Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build
biological weapons. They’re illegal. They’re against the United Nations
resolutions, and we’ve so far discovered two. And we’ll find more
weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven’t found the
banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they’re wrong, we
found them.

Similarly, Secretary Powell’s comments about the trailers frequently asserted with
certainty that the trailers were biological weapons laboratories. For example:

• On May 21, 2003, Secretary Powell said: “The intelligence community
has really looked hard at these vans, and we can find no other purpose for
them. Although you can’t find actual germs on them, they have been
cleaned and we don’t know whether they have been used for that purpose
or not, but they were certainly designed and constructed for that purpose.
And we have taken our time on this one because we wanted to make sure
we got it right. And the intelligence community, I think, is convinced now
that that’s the purpose they served.”

• On May 22, 2003, Secretary Powell said, “So far, we have found the
biological weapons vans that I spoke about when I presented the case to
the United Nations on the 5th of February, and there is no doubt in our
minds now that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that
was to make biological weapons.”

The doubts about the trailers were confirmed by the work of the Iraq Survey
Group. According to Dr. Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, “the consensus
opinion is that when you look at those two trailers, while [they] had capabilities in
many areas, their actual intended use was not for the production of biological
weapons.”91 In a separate interview, Dr. Kay explained that the trailers “were
actually designed to produce hydrogen for weather balloons, or perhaps to
produce rocket fuel.”

D. Statements about Iraq’s Support of al Qaeda
Another key component of the case for going to war against Iraq was the claim
that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda. As was the case with other featured claims,
the al Qaeda claims were disputed by intelligence officials within the
Administration. Yet President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld,
Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice regularly failed to
acknowledge these doubts or the weaknesses in the case linking Iraq and al
Qaeda. They made 61 misleading statements about the strength of the Iraq-al
Qaeda alliance in 52 public appearances.

Well before the war on Iraq, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
made clear that the U.S. intelligence community had serious doubts about the
threat of Iraq arming al Qaeda. In its section on “Confidence Levels for Selected
Key Judgements in this Estimate,” the NIE gave a “Low Confidence” rating to the
notion of “Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological
weapons with Al Qa’ida.” The discussion of this possibility in the NIE
contained highly qualified language: “Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might
decide that only an organization such as al-Qa’ida . . . could perpetuate the type of
terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.” The NIE also reported that
“Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist
attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure
of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making
war.”

Director of Central Intelligence Tenet stated in an October 2002 letter that there
were intelligence reports of contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq. At the same
time, however, he asserted clear qualifiers for this information: “Our
understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida is evolving and is
based on sources of varying reliability.”96 Senators who were briefed by
intelligence officials in the fall of 2002 expressed skepticism about the
significance of the link. For example, Senator Jeffords on October 8, 2002,
stated, “While there is talk of cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and I don’t
doubt that there has been some cooperation, I have not seen any hard evidence of
close cooperation.”

According to another account: Sen. Richard J. Durbin . . . said some classified
information he had seen did not support the administration’s portrayal of the Iraqi
threat. “It’s troubling to have classified information that contradicts statements made
by the administration,” Durbin said. “There’s more they should share with
the public.” Durbin would not be more specific, but he did say the
committee had received the views of some analysts who do not share the
administration’s conclusion that Iraq was an urgent threat with important
links to al-Qaeda terrorists.

Journalists also reported that many intelligence officials within the Administration
doubted the significance of reported contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda.
According to one report:

[A]nalysts at the C.I.A believed that the evidence showed some
contacts between Baghdad and the terrorist organization, but not an
operational alliance [A]t the C.I.A., many analysts believed that Mr.
bin Laden saw Mr. Hussein as one of the corrupt secular Arab leaders who
should be toppled.

Despite the doubts of many intelligence analysts, the five Administration officials
regularly asserted that there was a close relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.

For example:

• In a November 7, 2002, speech, President Bush stated: Saddam Hussein is
“a threat because he is dealing with Al Qaida [A] true threat facing
our country is that an Al Qaida-type network trained and armed by
Saddam could attack America and not leave one fingerprint.”

• In his January 28, 2003, State of the Union address, President Bush stated:
“Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and
statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and
protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without
fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or
help them develop their own.”

• In his February 5, 2003, remarks to the United Nations, Secretary of State
Colin Powell stated: “what I want to bring to your attention today is the
potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda
terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and
modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network
headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama
bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.”

• In remarks on May 1, 2003, announcing the end of major combat
operations in Iraq, President Bush stated: “The battle of Iraq is one
victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 — and
still goes on [T]he liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al
Qaeda.”

Vice President Cheney’s statements on this topic repeatedly cited reports of a
specific alleged Iraq–al Qaeda contact: a meeting between Mohammed Atta, one
of the September 11 hijackers, and a senior Iraqi official in Prague a few months
before September 11, 2001. For example, Vice President Cheney stated on
September 14, 2003:

With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out
there. The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in
Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the
attack, but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in
terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don’t know.

The Vice President’s assertions about this meeting omitted key information. He
did not acknowledge that the CIA and FBI had concluded before the war in Iraq
that “the meeting probably did not take place”; that Czech government officials
had developed doubts regarding whether this meeting occurred; or that
American records indicate that Mr. Atta was in Virginia Beach, Virginia, at the
time of the purported meeting.

Assessments following the war further highlighted the tenuous nature of the
Administration’s assertions about an Iraq-al Qaeda alliance. According to the
New York Times, “Since American forces toppled the Hussein government and the
United States gained access to captured Iraqi officials and Iraqi files, the C.I.A.
has not yet uncovered evidence that has altered its prewar assessment concerning
the connections between Mr. Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the leader of al
Qaeda, officials said.”

Consistent with this view, during Dr. Kay’s testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on January 28, 2004, the following exchange occurred
between Senator Warner and Dr. Kay:

Senator Warner: Any evidence with regard to participation by either
Saddam Hussein or his principal henchmen in the WMD-sharing with al
Qaeda or any other terrorist organizations?

Dr. Kay: Senator Levin — Senator Warner, there is no evidence that I can
think of that I know of.

V. MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS

A. President Bush
President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in
27 separate public statements or appearances.
Of the 55 misleading statements by President Bush, 4 claimed that Iraq posed an
urgent threat; 14 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 18
overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 19 misrepresented
Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

On October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and October 11, 2002,
congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, President Bush gave an address in
Cincinnati, Ohio, about the threat posed by Iraq. In this speech, President Bush
made 11 misleading statements about Iraq, the highest number of misleading
statements in any single appearance by any of the five officials. In this single
appearance, President Bush made misleading statements about Iraq’s nuclear
capabilities, Iraq’s efforts to procure aluminum tubes, Iraq’s chemical and
biological capabilities, and Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by President Bush included the
following:

• “On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency It has developed weapons of mass death.”

• “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

• “The liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al Qaeda.”

• “We found the weapons of mass destruction [F]or those who say we
haven’t found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons,
they’re wrong, we found them.”

B. Vice President Cheney
Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about the threat posed by
Iraq in 25 separate public statements or appearances.
Of the 51 misleading statements by Vice President Cheney, 1 claimed that Iraq
posed an urgent threat; 22 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons;
7 overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 21
misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by Vice President Cheney included the
following:

• “[W]e do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement
system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to
build a nuclear weapon.”

• Saddam Hussein “had an established relationship with al Qaeda.”

• “[W]e believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”

C. Secretary Rumsfeld
Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq
in 23 separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 52 misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld; 5 claimed that Iraq posed
an urgent threat; 18 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 21
overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 8 misrepresented
Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by Secretary Rumsfeld included the
following:

• “Now transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a
month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass
destruction and transfer them, either use himself, or transfer them to
the Al-Qaeda, and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack
on the United States . . . with a weapon of mass destruction you’re not
talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000,
or 100,000 . . . human beings.”

• “[Saddam Hussein’s] regime . . . recently was discovered seeking
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

• “We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate.”

D. Secretary Powell
Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in
34 separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 50 misleading statements by Secretary Powell, 1 claimed that Iraq posed an
urgent threat; 10 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 32
overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 7 misrepresented
Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Sometimes Secretary Powell used caveats and qualifying language in his public
statements. For example, on March 9, 2003, he said, “Well with respect to the
aluminum tubes, we still believe the case is out. The CIA has done a great deal of
analysis on those tubes. They are not persuaded they were just for rockets. And,
in fact, another nation this week, a European nation, came forward with some
additional information that still, I think, leaves it an open question as to what the
purpose of those tubes was.” Secretary Powell’s acknowledgement of
differences in this example was not an unqualified statement that only mentioned
one side of an intelligence debate.

On numerous other occasions, however, Secretary Powell made unconditional
statements about the threats posed by Iraq without disclosing the doubts of
intelligence officials. Some of the misleading statements he made included the
following:

• “Iraq is now concentrating . . . on developing and testing smaller
UAVs UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological
weapons.”

• “The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear
ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a
weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again.”126

• “So far, we have found the biological weapons vans that I spoke about
when I presented the case to the United Nations on the 5th of February,
and there is no doubt in our minds that those vans were designed for only
one purpose, and that was to make biological weapons.”127

E. National Security Advisor Rice
Ms. Rice made 29 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 16
separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 29 misleading statements by Ms. Rice, 17 concerned Iraq’s efforts to
develop nuclear weapons; 6 overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons
capacity; and 6 misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.
Some of the misleading statements made by Ms. Rice included the following:

• “We do know that [Saddam Hussein] is actively pursuing a nuclear
weapon.”

• “We do know that there have been shipments going into . . . Iraq, for
instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to — high quality
aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs,
centrifuge programs.”
• “[T]he declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get
uranium from abroad.”

Ms. Rice made significantly more statements that were false — 8 — than any of
the other four officials. Many of these statements came in June and July 2003
when questions were being raised about why President Bush asserted in his State
of the Union address that Iraq was seeking to import uranium from Africa. Ms.
Rice repeatedly stated during this period that no one in the White House was
informed of the doubts about this uranium claim. For example, she stated:

• “We did not know at the time — no one knew at the time, in our circles —
maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our
circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a
forgery.”

• “[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence
in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of
Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.”

These statements were simply false. As explained above, the CIA had repeatedly
communicated its objections to White House officials, including Ms. Rice.

VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the gravity of the subject and the President’s unique access to
classified information, members of Congress and the public expect the President
and his senior officials to take special care to be balanced and accurate in
describing national security threats. It does not appear, however, that President
Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and
National Security Advisor Rice met this standard in the case of Iraq. To the
contrary, these five officials repeatedly made misleading statements about the
threat posed by Iraq. In 125 separate appearances, they made 11 misleading
statements about the urgency of Iraq’s threat, 81 misleading statements about
Iraq’s nuclear activities, 84 misleading statements about Iraq’s chemical and
biological capabilities, and 61 misleading statements about Iraq’s relationship
with al Qaeda.